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Looking Back: Unneeded X-rays*
Allan Mazur**
Introduction
I recall shopping for shoes in the 194 0s. To check the fit, I, my
mother and the salesman peered down into an x-ray fluoroscope while
I wiggled my toes. At the pediatrician's office, the doctor and my
mother also looked at a screen showing my insides. 1 This had no
important diagnostic value for healthy-appearing children, but low level
x-rays were not regarded as too costly for entertainment.
Thomas Edison set an assistant to work on the fluoroscope in 1896,
only a year after Wilhelm Roentgen discovered x-rays. The assistant's
hair fell out after frequent exposure to the rays, and his hands become
ulcerated and then cancerous; eventually the disease killed him. Because
of such experiences, it was thought that radiation had to inflict
ulceration or other gross damage to cause malignancy, and that if
dosages large enough to produce burns or other severe bodily changes
were avoided they were safe. With this mindset, early workers tested
the functioning of their machines on their own hands as they began
work each day, eventually accumulating massive doses.
By the 1920s, it was apparent from the large number of burns and
other skin problems suffered by radiation workers, and some ensuing
cancers, that safety standards were desirable. A British group led the
way, recommending that x-ray and radium workers keep distance and
lead shielding between themselves and the radiation source, and that
they work not more than 35 hours per week or have less than one
month's holiday per year. Not until 1934, did the U.S. National
Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP) recommend a maximum
*
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permissible exposure level. The NCRP fixed 0.1 rem (r) per day as a
limit adequate to prevent overt skin damage and more serious
2
consequences.
In 1949 two articles appeared in The New England Journal of
Medicine about shoe-fitting fluoroscopes. One reported that
exposures to customers and clerks often exceeded the maximum
permissible dose. The other claimed that the most likely injuries from
shoe fluoroscopy were malformation of growing feet, skin damage, and
injury to the blood-forming tissues of store clerks. These were all
dangers that could have been controlled by proper regulation of the
3
machines, and posting signs to warn against too many exposures.
There was no move to eliminate shoe fluoroscopy entirely.
In 1954, a Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, was
accidentally showered with fallout from an U.S. hydrogen bomb test.
As a result, a social movement aimed specifically at halting atmospheric
testing began first in Japan and then moved to the U.S. and then
Europe. 4 This anti-testing movement, more generally an expression
of opposition to the arms race and nuclear confrontation with the
Soviets, had an enormous effect on public perceptions of environmental
radiation and its dangers, which became a presidential election issue in
1956. Partly in response, and also anticipating the introduction of
peaceful nuclear energy, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in
1956 reported that the U.S. population was being exposed to far less
radiation from weapons-testing fallout than from either naturallyoccurring sources such as cosmic rays or, surprisingly, from medical and
5
dental x-rays.
By this time it was known, experiments on fruit flies and mice had
yielded that sizable doses of x-rays could produce genetic mutations in
2 Lauriston Taylor, History of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection, 1 Health Physics 97 (1958). Prior to World War II, the roentgen was the
common measurement unit for x-rays. Newer units, the rad and rem, were defined to
incorporate other forms of ionizing radiation, and these too have been superceded,
confronting the historian with confusing terminology. Fortunately, these units are
essentially equivalent for x-rays, so I have expressed them all in terms of rems. The
NCRP has evolved, under a slightly extended name, into a quasi-governmental
authority on radiation risks.
3 Edward Lawless, Technology and Social Shock (1977).
4 See Mazur, A Hazardous Inquiry, supra note 1.
5 See Lawless, supra note 3.
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the descendants of irradiated individuals, and that the mutation rate
increased with the dose of radiation. The NAS committee, dominated
by geneticists, focused on this danger and asserted in its report more
than had truly been demonstrated experimentally. Namely, that any
amount of radiation to the gonads, however small, can cause mutations,
and that "a little radiation to a lot of people is as harmful as a lot of
radiation to a few, since the total number of mutant genes can be the
same in the two cases." 6 The committee estimated that the amount
of radiation required to double the naturally-occurring mutation rate in
humans was probably 30 to 80r. It recommended - without any
clearly stated rationale - that average cumulative &xposure to the
population's gonads from man-made sources should not exceed 10r
from conception to age 30 (the mean age of reproduction). The
committee estimated fallout exposure from weapons testing to be only
one percent of this limit, while exposure from medical x-rays and
fluoroscopy was 30 times higher than from fallout! Dr. Warren Weaver,
a principal of the report, warned at an NAS press conference, "We have
been rather profligate about using x-rays.... If anything is stupid from a
genetic point of view, it is to use x-rays to fit shoes on people." He also
condemned obstetricians who x-ray pregnant women merely to show
7
them how "beautifully formed" is the skeleton of their baby.
These conclusions were widely reported, including a prominent
story on the front page of the most important agenda-setter of the
American press, The New York Times (June 13, 1956), which
published the entire genetics portion of the report. Rather than
lessening public worries about fallout, the effect of the report (and of
subsequent media coverage) was to extend these concerns to medical
and dental x-rays. Radiologists blamed most over-exposure to x-rays
on faulty equipment or sloppy procedures by untrained technicians,
saying that the public was becoming unduly frightened of a valuable
diagnostic procedure.
6 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation
(1956); U.S. News &World Report 64 (June 22, 1956). The NAS committee seems
to have chosen 10r as a limit because it is the lowest round number above the 4r that
an average person receives from naturally-occurring background radiation. In 1957 the
NCRP lowered its maximum permissible dose or the average person to the level
recommended by the NAS.
7 Id.
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The anti-fallout movement ended abruptly in 1963 when President
Kennedy and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, frightened by a
clash the previous year over Soviet missiles in Cuba, agreed to halt
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and eased Cold War tensions.
Once exacerbated by the fallout controversy, press and public concern
with medical x-rays also declined. However, public concern arose again
in 1967 when many color TVs were discovered to emit significant
amounts of x-rays. Congressional hearings rejuvenated public
concern 8 and led to Food and Drug Administration responsibility for
reducing unnecessary human exposure to manmade radiation from
television and from medical and dental radiology.
By this time most states had banned the use of x-rays on humans by
anyone other than medical or dental personnel, and shoe fluoroscopy
had fallen out of favor. The last functioning shoe fluoroscope, as far as I
kmow, was discovered in 1981 in a West Virginia department store and
finally donated for display in a medical museum. Gratuitous x-rays in
medical practice, including fluoroscopy in routine pediatric and
obstetric examinations, were also eliminated, especially as sonograms
provided an innocuous replacement. When medial or dental radiation
was warranted, there was a clear trend toward increased shielding,
better focusing of the ray, and reduced exposures permitted by more
sensitive film. Marginal uses of the ray were reconsidered, notably the
curbside radiology vans sponsored by tuberculosis associations, in which
the public had been urged since the 1940s to get a yearly chest xray. 9 The possibility was raised that mammography screening for
breast cancer might cause more tumors than it discovered among
younger women. By this time, irradiation of children's throats and
heads was stopped for the treatment of minor problems like enlarged
tonsils, ringworm or acne, because these exposures caused thyroid
cancer many years after exposure (in my own case, 28 years later). 10
8
9

Lawless, supra note 3, at 197.
(By 1970 tuberculosis had declined to an extent that the disease was rarely

discovered through x-rays, and in any case, the tuberculin skin test had become the

preferred and less expensive method of screening.) See Bryce Nelson, Mobile TB Xray Units: An Obsolete Technology Lingers, 174 Science 1114 (1971)Nelson, infra
note 10.
10 See Nelson, supra note 9 and Allan Mazur, The Dynamics of Technical

Controversy (1981).
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Risk Assessment
The 1956 NAS committee knew from emerging data on leukemia
in Japanese atomic-bomb survivors, and from malignancies in women
who had painted radium on luminous watch faces, that ionizing
radiation at high doses could cause leukemia and bone cancer. But it
showed little concern about cancer from the low doses that the average
person received from fallout, x-rays, and natural sources, which it
estimated at less than 10r over 30 years. Instead the committee's
emphasis was on the harm of genetic mutations to future generations,
which it regarded as the primary problem of low doses.
The committee's reasoning is clear enough. A mutation in an egg or
sperm cell might be caused by a single hit of ionizing radiation to the
gonads; that could suffice to break one chemical bond in a gene,
altering its function in all subsequent replications. Therefore any degree
of radiation, however small, carried the possibility of mutation.
Cancers, on the other hand, did not develop until years or decades after
a person's exposure to radiation, making it implausible that
carcinogenesis was a single-stage process, fully implemented by one hit
of radiation. It seemed more likely that some minimum threshold level
of radiation exposure was required before cancers are induced. If the
threshold was above 10r, as was widely assumed, cancers would not be
caused by the low exposures of concern to the committee in 1956.
In 1958, Linus Pauling published No More War, his polemic
against atomic war and weapons testing, a book as important as Silent
Spring in launching public concern about environmental
contamination. 1 Pauling, winner of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry,
argued that there was no exposure threshold and that even the lowest
levels of exposure could cause cancer, just as they caused genetic
mutation. Pauling estimated that if a population's radiation exposure
were increased by only one rem it would produce two additional cases
of leukemia per million people per year, and about one-fifth as many
new bone cancers. He calculated that worldwide fallout from the
atmospheric testing of a single large nuclear weapon eventually would
11 Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) is better remembered today, but Pauling's
book was as important at the time of publication, contributing to his receipt of the
1962 Nobel Peace Prize. Carson adapted the imagery of radioactive fallout, famously
picturing pesticides as white powder, falling like snow on the roofs of an American
town, causing a mysterious affliction that kills first animals, then humans.
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 1 [Winter 2000]

lead to the deaths of 10,000 people by leukemia and bone cancer, and
possibly 90,000 more by other diseases, plus genetic effects in
babies. 12 These were controversial claims.
After the 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty public fears about
fallout lessened and the scientific debate about cancer hazards from
low-level radiation remained of interest only to professionals. But the
respite was brief, and by 1970 the debate had returned to the
newspapers atop another public issue: the growing nuclear power
industry. Drs. John Gofman and Arthur Tamplin, two health physicists
at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in California, accepted the
assumption that radiation has no threshold for cancer, that even the
smallest exposures are carcinogenic. They asserted to public audiences,
including Congress, that if the American population were exposed to
radiation from nuclear power plants at the maximum level permitted
by federal regulations, there would be, each year, an additional 32,000
cases of leukemia and other types of cancer. Hearing echoes of Pauling,
13
the nuclear industry nearly overheated with denial.
Responding to the tumult, the NAS again convened a committee of
experts to re-evaluate the hazards of low-level radiation in the light of
new knowledge, and on the assumption that cooler heads working
outside the limelight might reach a rational conclusion. By 1966, an
excess of roughly 100 leukemia cases had been observed among
117,000 survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. From
these and studies of patients who had gotten cancer from medical
irradiation, it was clear that the number of malignancies produced in a
population is proportional to the cumulative dose of radiation to the
whole body. However this linear relationship was confidently observed
only at sizable exposures, above 50r. If excess cancers were being
produced at lower doses, they were too few in number to be
confidently recognized. Nonetheless, the new NAS committee
concluded - consistent with Pauling, Gofman and Tamplin - that
"the only workable approach to numerical estimation" of low-exposure
effects is to extrapolate the linear dose-response relationship, known for
sizable exposures, down to zero dose. On this assumption, the
12 Linus Pauling, No More War at 105 (1958), acknowledged some uncertainty in
his numbers.
13 Mazur, supra note 10.
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committee calculated that if the American population was exposed to
radiation at the maximum level permitted by federal regulations, there
would be an additional 6,000 cancer deaths each year. The committee's
1972 report recommended that the maximum permissible exposure to
the public be lowered and sharply admonished the medical profession
14
to voluntarily limit its use of x-rays.
NAS committees have continued to assess biological effects of xrays. By 1985, fortunately, no statistically significant excess of genetic
defects had been detected among the children of A-bomb survivors,
but hundreds of excess cancers had appeared among the survivors
themselves. Clearly, solid cancers as well as leukemia increase in
frequency with increasing dose, but this has been confidently observed
only at exposures above 10r. The most recent NAS committee to
evaluate x-ray effects reported in 1990 that it did not know the degree
to which doses below 10r produce cancer, or if x-rays at such low doses
cause any cancer at all. Nonetheless, this committee, like the others
since 1972, extrapolated the dose-response curve down to zero dose,
15
assuming no threshold.
Conclusion
In 1956, dental x-rays and fluoroscopy might have delivered several
reins in a single exposure, whereas a single shot today should be less
than one rem. The 1990 NAS committee estimated that the average
American is exposed to .04r per year from diagnostic x-rays. How
many cancer deaths does this cause in the American population?
Assuming no threshold of exposure, the 1990 NAS committee
estimated that if one million people of all ages continuously received
0.1r of x-rays annually, this would cause about 5,600 extra cancer
deaths during their remaining lifetimes (or about 0.5% more cancer
deaths than would normally be expected). At low doses, the
committee's risk estimate is directly proportional to dose, so a yearly
14 NAS, The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation (1972). Robert Gillette, Radiation Standards: The Last Word or at Least a
Definitive One, 178 Science 966 (1972). The committee estimated the effect of
radiation on leukemia to be half of Pauling's estimate, and it discounted radiationinduced thyroid cancers because they are not usually fatal.

15 NAS, supra note 6: BEIRV (1990) [2d].
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exposure of 0.04r - the average American's annual exposure to
diagnostic x-rays - would eventually cause 2,250 extra cancer deaths
per million, or a total of 604,800 cancer deaths among the 270 million
Americans alive today. On the other hand, if there is a threshold of 1r
or higher, a possibility the committee does not deny, then there are
16
zero extra deaths from diagnostic x-rays.
Ambiguity may always remain about the harm caused by very low
doses of ionizing radiation. The reason is that doses below 10r are
expected, even in the worst case, to cause so few cancers that it would
take a huge number of irradiated individuals - far more than 100,000
A-bomb survivors (or laboratory mice) - to detect with confidence
any increase above the far larger number of normally-occurring cancers.
Responding to this gap in knowledge, and mindful of the possibility of
a threshold, the Health Physics Society, a professional organization
promoting radiation safety, recommended in 1996 against any
quantitative estimation of health risks for lifetime doses below 10r
above background radiation.
Happily, despite continued disagreement about actual effects, a
consensus has evolved among responsible authorities that unneeded xrays, even at low exposures, cannot be justified, given the possible
adverse effects. No one today would favor shoe fluoroscopy or the
irradiation of fetuses. Furthermore, it is widely held that when x-rays
are needed, exposures should be kept as low as is reasonably
achievable. 17

16 Id., at 7 and 171-81. At low doses, the committee's preferred risk models are
linear.
17 See, e.g., NCRP, The Application of ALARA for Occupational Exposures
(1999).

